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The main purpose of this work project is to investigate whether attributes of board of 
directors such as gender, board’s size, type auditor hired, proportion of foreign directors 
and outside directors influence company performance. A hierarchical ordinary least 
square regression is performed using data from 83 non-financial companies listed on the 
Portuguese and Spanish stock exchange. The conclusions indicate that board size and 
proportion of foreign directors are positively related to company turnover. Concerning 
the control variables used, company size is positively related to company performance. 










There have been many discussions among researchers, scholars and governmental 
agencies on the area of corporate governance, especially after the financial crisis of the 
last decades, most of these scandals in the corporate world. Worth to mention are 
Siemens, Enron, Parmalat, Tyco, Volkswagen, as well as a large number of banks, who 
were charged with bribery, fraud, corruption or other ways of financial greed. The results 
of these scandals made governments to take measures and intervene on their corporate 
governance systems. The first to apply these changes were the US with the Sarbanes-
Oxley act and the UK with the Cadbury Committee (1992) recommendations and most 
recent (OECD 2004), (G20/OECD 2015) and the Bank of International Settlements 
(2015).  
Corporate governance is the framework by which firms conduct their business and are 
controlled. More precisely, assures companies’ stakeholders to get their return on 
investment (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). This framework consists of a separation of 
ownership from management. Directors are elected by the stockholders of the company, 
and they have the power to appoint and supervise the management. Conflicts between the 
management and shareholders may arise due to contradictory personal financial interests, 
which can negatively affect company’s performance. (Fama and Jensen 1983), refer to 
this as agency costs, which is the reduction of company’s performance due to internal 
conflicts between the principal and the agent. Other papers in the field of corporate 
governance study the relation between the financial performance and various 
characteristics of board governance. Most of this research has been conducted on board 
elements, such as independence, composition, frequency of board meetings, board size, 
gender and ethnic diversity, and mostly focused on US companies (Fama and Jensen, 
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1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Nicholson and C., 2007; 
Carter et al., 2010).  
For instance, Carter et al. (2010) argue that there is no significant relationship between 
the financial performance of major US companies, and ethnic and gender diversity on 
their boards. Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader (2003) measured diversity through the 
percentages of minorities (e.g. women) on board of 127 US firms and concluded that 
board diversity is positively correlated with the indicators of company’s performance. On 
the other hand empirical evidence from India demonstrates that a large number of 
independent directors negatively effects firms’ performance, differently from board size 
that is positively correlated with performance (Chugh, Meador and Kumar 2011). 
This dissertation researches the relationship between the characteristics of boards of 
directors and performance in Portuguese and Spanish listed non-financial firms. The main 
objective is to identify how board diversity influences company performance and more 
specifically which board diversity elements affect firm performance the most. The 
following sections are organized as follows: Section two presents a literature review on 
prior research done on the corporate governance area; Section three provides the data and 
sample selection process; Section four present the empirical analysis conducted and a step 
by step explanation of the tests applied; Section five presents the empirical results; 






2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 2.1 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is the framework by which firms are controlled and managed. This 
framework determines the relationship between board of directors, stakeholders and 
management of a corporation, which strongly affects company’s operations. 
Fundamentally, it deals with the separation of control from ownership and it’s a tool for 
preventing principal-agent conflicts (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
Corporate governance also supplies the instruments through which a firm sets its 
objectives, and the mechanisms of maintaining those objectives and supervising its 
performance (OECD 2004).  
Good corporate governance establishes a fair and transparent business environment and 
ensures the veracity of corporates’ actions. On the other hand, fragile governance can lead 
to mismanagement, waste of resources and corruption (Youssef 2011).  
Conformity to corporate governance framework benefits to many parties in the business 
environment, but the main focus remains to the shareholders, companies and the national 
economy. At first, it provides shareholders with information regarding financial and 
managerial issues, so they can have a greater insurance on their investment. From a 
company’s perspective, good corporate governance makes financial and capital markets 
easily accessible (Youssef 2011). Often, during financial crisis, firms are obliged to go 
through tough corporate governance reforms in order to seek funds. Also, it helps them 
sustain in a steadily competitive environment through partnerships, M&A and 
diversification. Generally, a better corporate governance demands better internal control 
systems, hence leading to higher profit margins and greater accountability. As last, a 
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country that does not enforce robust corporate governance frameworks will not obtain 
any capital in-flows, for the fact that investors may doubt reporting standards and the 
level of disclosure. (Youssef 2011) 
2.2 Board characteristics and performance 
Usually boards of directors have two type of functions in a company: a monitoring and 
controlling function and a consultative role towards management (M. C. Jensen 1993). 
There are theories that support each of the BoD’s functions. Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 
(2003) prove that the importance of the controlling role is accentuated by the agency 
theory, whereas the importance of the consultative role is emphasized by the resource 
dependence theory (Zahra and Pearce, 1989),(Johnson, Ellstrand and Daily, 1996), 
(Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003).  Both these theories suggest that some board 
characteristics can have an impact on the monitoring and advising role of the board 
(Bianco, Ciavarella and Signoretti 2013), hence affecting firm performance. Agency 
theory stresses the fact that the segregation of the management from ownership leads to 
managers’ self-centered behavior and information asymmetry, meaning more agency 
costs and conflicts for the company. Research has found that in order to reduce the agency 
costs and assure an effective control and monitoring, boards of directors are chosen as an 
internal ruling body (Park and Shin 2004). Consequently, it is board’s responsibility to 
apply effective corporate governance practices, being that they are liable for the well-
functioning of the company and its financial performance. Board’s actions in applying 
efficacious practices may depend on board’s characteristics. For example, a highly 
dependent board can negatively affect performance since independent directors are less 
informed than inside directors and they are not full-time employed by the company 
(Bozec 2005). The diversity of board of directors is defined from a number of board’s 
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characteristics, in this study the following are analyzed: gender, board size, auditing 
company, proportion of non-nationals, and interlocking directors. In order to test the 
relationship between boards’ diversity and company performance the following 
hypothesis are formulated: 
Gender diversity: Previous studies consider gender and ethnic diversity to have the same 
impact on company performance, so they merge these two characteristics in the same 
variable. However, this research follows the suggestion of Carter et al (2010), whom find 
significant differences between ethnic minority directors and women directors based on 
human capital theory. In this paper, gender diversity represents the gender difference on 
boards of directors, hence the proportion of women out of the total number of directors. 
Gender studies around the world link women with qualities such as tender, empathy, 
affection and interest in promoting important values in a community (Eagly, Karau and 
Makhijani, 1995; Boulouta, 2013), hence women could indirectly improve firm 
performance. Consistent with this logic, several studies pose that female participation in 
boards boosts companies’ returns (Erhardt et al., 2003; Francoeur, Labelle and Sinclair-
Desgagné, 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Contrarily, others have found a negative 
impact of gender diversity in performance (Shrader and Blackburn 1997), and still others 
report no impact at all or inconclusive results (Daily et al., 1999; Carter et al., 2003; 
Adams, Gupta and Leeth, 2009). Considering the above-mentioned studies, it is deduced 
that company performance improves when wider female presence on boards. 
 Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, wider presence of female directors on boards will 
improve company performance. 
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Board Size: Board size in this paper represents the number of directors sitting on a 
company’s board. According to Limpton and Jay (1992) by limiting board’s size to seven 
or eight members, there will be better coordination, communication and compliance in 
decision-making, hence increasing board’s performance. On the same line Jensen (1993) 
states that smaller boards can boost company performance, as there is a wider 
participation from all members in the monitoring and evaluation process of the 
management’s activities.  However, alternative studies based on the resource dependence 
theory argue that larger boards have greater collective information in their possession, 
leading to a higher performance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Guest, 2009,). Another 
advantage of large boards is that their members can support the management with better 
counseling, as there are higher chances that the members come from different industry 
sectors and backgrounds and can offer a high quality expertise (Dalton et al. 1999; Lopes 
and Ferraz, 2016). Based on these arguments, it is inferred that larger boards of directors 
improve company performance.  
 Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, larger boards will enhance company performance. 
Auditor:  Auditing provides a control and bonding mechanism so to minimize the agency 
costs provoked by asymmetric information between parties (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this study, the hired auditing company has been 
considered as one of the board’s characteristics, more specifically it is defined if the board 
has contracted a Big 4 auditing firm or not. Based on the Taiwanese market, Lee and Lee, 
(2013) proved that the equity book value and the earnings audited by Big 4 auditors justify 
more the variations in stock returns than those audited by other auditors. Their results are 
in favor of the efficiency of audits offered by Big 4 audit firms, as the financial reports 
audited by them give a more accurate and relevant information for company value, 
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therefore is more appropriate for projecting future value of the firm. Based on these 
arguments, it is inferred that the type of audit firm contracted influences company 
performance. 
 Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, company performance is influenced by the type of 
audit firm hired. 
Board composition: In this paper, board composition refers to the diversity of 
nationalities in the board of directors, hence the number of ‘non-nationals’ sitting on a 
companies’ boards. Other researchers have analyzed the impact of foreign directors on 
company performance. Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) in accordance with the resource 
dependence theory confirm that the participation of foreign directors in boards improves 
company performance due to their experience in foreign markets and also cultural 
knowledge. Particularly, they increase board’s network of contacts and its international 
exposure. Contrarily, evidence from Switzerland shows that a high number of diverse 
nationalities in boards can complicate the integration and communication within board 
members. This leading to conflicts which can affect the decision making process of the 
board and its performance (Ruigrok, Peck and Tacheva 2007). In general, empirical 
studies show a positive relationship among company performance and ‘non-national’ 
directors. Evidence from the Korean market also confirms that international diversity 
among board members positively effects performance (Choi, Park and Yoo 2007).  
Following these arguments, it is deduced that foreign directors’ participation will increase 
company performance. 
 Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, the presence of foreign directors on boards will 
improve firm performance. 
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Interlocking directorate: Interlocking directorate is a common phenomenon that arises 
when one or more board members sit on another’s company board of directors (Mizruchi 
1996). Here it’s measured as the ratio of board’s members who sit on external companies’ 
boards. It has been reported that publicly traded companies disclosed relevant 
enhancement in operating performance when they had appointed at least three outside 
directors on their board of directors (Dahya and Mcconnell 2005). Brickley and James 
(1987) noted that a relevant number of external directors has the tendency to better control 
and lower management’s benefits and perks. Alternatively, a study focused on US 
companies shows that there is a negative relation between firm performance and outside 
directors (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996). In addition, it was observed that a high number 
of outside directors on a board negatively influences company performance, on terms of 
price-earnings ratio and return on assets (Ehikioya 2009) and market value added (Coles 
et al. 2001). Nevertheless, many other studies report inconclusive results on the link 
between company performance and the ration of outside directors (Mehran, 1995; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Bhagat and Black, 2008). Evidence from the South 
Korean market also finds no correlation between the above mention variables (Black, 
Jang and Kim 2006). Considering that the expertise and experience of outside directors 
could be an asset for the company, it is inferred that interlocking directorate improves 
firm performance. 
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, the presence of a considerable number of outside 





3. Data and sample selection 
The data on which this paper is based is extracted from publicly listed companies on the 
Portuguese (PSI 20) and Spanish Stock Market (IBEX 35). Companies operating in the 
financial industry were excluded from the dataset being that they undergo different 
governance regulations compared to other companies (Klein 1998). Data relevant to the 
attributes of the independent variables were taken from the 2013 annual corporate 
governance report of the selected companies, while the data related to the companies’ 
performance measures were extracted from DataStream for the 2014 financial year. After 
excluding 44 financial companies and eliminating companies with missing information, 
a sample of 97 companies was available for this empirical study. 
Before conducting the empirical analysis it is necessary to make sure that the available 
sample is eligible for applying a multiple regression. The data has been checked for some 
required assumptions with the help of SPSS Statistics, so the performed regression could 
give valid results. Durbin-Watson statistic assures the independence of observations and 
takes a value of 2.134, showing that there is no correlation in the chosen sample. 
Additionally, it has been verified that the residuals are normally distributed and they fit 
the normal distribution line.  There should be a linear relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable and it can easily verified by visually 
inspecting the scatterplot. The data has also been tested for homoscedasticity so to assure 
that the variances remain similar when moving along the residuals line. Furthermore, it 
should be checked that the independent variables are not highly correlated with each 
other, which can be verified by observing the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values. 
Being that the independent variables have a VIF value between 1.069 and 2.670 (not close 
to 10), it can be said that there is no multicollinearity. As last, three other tools are used 
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in order to eliminate significant outliers, high leverage and influential points, which 
otherwise can reduce the significance and the predictive accuracy of the model. The 
respective measures where set as follows: Mahalanobis Distance < 16.919; Centered 
Leverage Value < 0.295; Cook’s Distance < 1. After eliminating all the outliers and 
running all the necessary test, a final sample of 83 companies (Portugal 33; Spain 50) was 
available for the empirical model. 
 
Table 1. Description of variables 
Variable type Variable Description 
DEPENDENT 
TURit Logarithm of company's turnover (Net sales) 
ROEit Net income to shareholders equity ratio 
ROSit EBIT to total sales and services ratio 
ROAit Net income to total assets ratio 
NET-INCit Net income after preferred dividends 
INDEPENDENT 
BDWOMit Proportion of women in company's board of directors 
BDNON-NATit Proportion of foreigners (non-nationals) in company's 
board of directors 
AUDit Auditing company hired (1 if Big4, 0 otherwise) 
BDEXECit Proportion of executive members in company's board of 
directors 
BDAGEit Board's members average age 
BDINDit Proportion of independent in the board 
BDEXTit Proportion of memebers sitting on external companies' 
boards 
BDSIZEit Number of member sitting on the board of directors 
COUNTit Company listed on the Portuguese or Spanish Stock 
Exchange (1 if Portuguese, 0 if Spanish) 
CONTROL 
SIZEit Logarithm of total assets 





4. Empirical Model 
The work project attempts to analyze the effect of board of director’s diversity on 
company performance. Some accounting based measures like ROE, ROA, ROS, 
Company Turnover and Net Income, were used to evaluate the performance of the 
selected firms. Firstly, these measures were examined via correlation analysis with a 
number of board characteristics as described in Table 1 above, in order to test the 
relationship between the variables. Secondly, a hierarchical regression analysis was 
implemented to determine the effect of the boards’ characteristics variables on the 
performance measures. In the first step of the regression analysis, Size (logarithm of total 
assets) and Leverage (total debts to total assets) of the selected companies were entered 
as control variables. Then, the rest of the independent variables were added to the 
regression. The resulting levels of significance were determined by the change in the 
explained variance. This approach to the analysis is considered as a befitting way to 
analyze variations in the dependent variables (Cohen, et al. 2003). 
The empirical model built identifies which of the variables best explains the variance of 
the dependent variable and it is expressed with the following equation: 
 
(1): Yit = β0 + β1BDSIZEit + β2BDWOMit + β3BDINDit + β3BDNON-NATit + 
β4BDAGEit + β8BDEXTit + β5BDEXECit + β6AUDit + β7COUNTit + εit 





5. Results and Interpretation 
 5.1 Descriptive and correlation measures 
Firms used for the purpose of this study operate in nine different activity sectors. 
Companies in the ‘Industrials’ sector represent 25.3% of the total sample, including 
transportation, electronic, aerospace and defense, construction and materials, electronics, 
and electrical equipment. The second most representative sector of the sample is 
‘Consumer Goods’ with 19.8%, which includes food and beverage producers, leisure 
goods, tobacco, home construction, and automobiles. Regarding the ‘AUD’ variable, 
84.4% of the companies hired a Big4 audit firm and only 13 (15.6%) were audited by a 
non-Big4 audit firm. The descriptive statistics are revealed in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
  
N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. S.E Stat. Stat. 
TUR 83 9.863 17.670 13.783 1.813 -0.029 0.264 -0.339 0.523 
LEV 83 0.004 1.076 0.370 0.190 0.572 0.264 1.660 0.523 
SIZE 83 10.055 18.024 14.294 1.914 -0.074 0.264 -0.628 0.523 
BDSIZE 83 5 23 11.337 3.660 0.666 0.264 0.262 0.523 
BDWOM 83 0.000 0.364 0.113 0.104 0.686 0.264 -0.361 0.523 
BDIND 83 0.000 0.889 0.354 0.190 0.208 0.264 -0.163 0.523 
BDNON_NA
T 
83 0.000 1.000 0.164 0.217 1.542 0.264 2.235 0.523 
BDAGE 83 47.313 66.286 58.203 3.861 -0.126 0.264 0.221 0.523 
BDEXT 83 0.222 1.000 0.705 0.162 -0.013 0.264 -0.058 0.523 
BDEXEC 83 0.000 0.875 0.274 0.166 1.104 0.264 1.764 0.523 
AUD 83 0 1 .892 .313 -2.565 .264 4.693 .523 





Pearson’s correlation matrix in Table. 3 shows the statistically significant relationships 
of the dependent variable, TUR, with the independent variables which represent the 
boards’ characteristics. TUR is correlated with BDSIZE (R=0.656; p=0.000), BDIND 
(R=0.247; p=0.012), BDNON_NAT (R=-.172; p=0.060), BDAGE (R=0.253; p=0.011), 
BDEXT (R=-0.167; p=0.066) BDEXEC (R=-0.311; p=0.002) and AUD (R=0.306; 
p=0.002). Hence, these coefficients support the results achieved by Dalton, et al. (1999) 
and Guest (2009), that larger boards lead to higher company perfomance. However they 
contradict the outcome of Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) who suggest that 
coordination and director free-riding make larger boards less effective. Confirming the 
results of Lee and Lee (2013), the performance of companies is influenced by the type of 
auditor. Firms that hire a Big4 auditor perform better than those audited by non-Big4 
companies. 
Moreover, looking at the Pearson’s correlation matrix it can be confirmed that there is no 
multicollinearity between the independent variables in the regression model. The 
Pearson’s coefficient cannot exceed 0.80, otherwise the regression model will have 














Table 3: Pearson's Correlations 
 TUR LEV SIZE BDSIZE BDWOM BDIND BDNON_NAT BDAGE BDEXT BDEXEC AUD COUNT 
TUR 
R 1            
Sig.             
LEV 
R .008 1           
Sig. .472            
SIZE 
R .934*** .119 1          
Sig. .000 .143           
BDSIZE 
R .656*** .136 .699*** 1         
Sig. .000 .110 .000          
BDWOM 
R .070 .075 .089 .054 1        
Sig. .264 .250 .211 .315         
BDIND 
R .247** -.149 .249** .045 .029 1       
Sig. .012 .089 .012 .344 .399        
BDNON_NAT 
R 0.172* -.066 .197** -.024 -.126 .011 1      
Sig. .060 .277 .037 .415 .129 .459       
BDAGE 
R .253** -.036 .251** .018 -.216** .194** .131 1     
Sig. .011 .372 .011 .436 .025 .040 .119      
BDEXT 
R -0.167* .074 -0.173* -.123 .196** -.337*** 0.148* -.118 1    
Sig. .066 .254 .059 .133 .038 .001 .091 .143     
BDEXEC 
R -.311*** .044 -.327*** -.306*** .021 -.364*** -.068 -.093 .333*** 1   
Sig. .002 .346 .001 .002 .425 .000 .271 .201 .001    
AUD 
R .306*** -.044 .258*** .107 .027 .255** .133 .291*** -.236** -0.177* 1  
Sig. .002 .345 .009 .168 .406 .010 .115 .004 .016 .054   
COUNT 
R -.358*** .018 -.324*** -0.156* -.116 -.326*** .120 -.205** .458*** .678*** -.350*** 1 
Sig. .000 .437 .001 .079 .148 .001 .139 .031 .000 .000 .001  
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; *. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level. 
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 5.2 The regression model 
A hierarchical ordinary least square regression is conducted to study the impact of 
independent variables on company performance. As mentioned above several accounting 
based measures have been considered as dependent variables (ROE, ROA, ROS, 
Company Turnover and Net Income), but only the model using Company Turnover could 
be validated. Lopes and Ferraz (2016) also find no emprical evidence that diveristy 
variables affect ROE, ROA and ROS when investigating the impact of intellectual 
resources and board diversity in Iberian business organizations. The other variables do 
not seem to be a good fit for the model, as when regressed with boards’ diversity 
measures, the latter fail to explain any variance on performance.  
Table 4 below presents the results of the regression model conducted, which it can only 
be applied to predict company’s turnover. By looking at the Adjusted R Square value 
(Adj. R2 = 0.893), it can be stated that the set of observations used fit very well to the 
model. R Square is equal to 0.893, meaning that 89.3% of TUR’s (Company performance) 
variability is explained by the model. F-statistic takes a value of 54.139 and is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level, which proves that the model as a whole has good predictive 
capability. 
 
Table 4. Model Summary    















1 .945b .893 .877 .6358005 2.134 21.885 54.139 0.000 
Predictors: (Constant), COUNT, BDWOM, BDSIZE, BDNON_NAT, BDIND, BDAGE, AUD, BDEXT, BDEXEC, LEV, 
SIZE  




A summary of the effect of explanatory variables on company performance (TUR) is 
presented on Table 5 below. The independent variables (board’s characteristics) that 
statistically influence TUR are: LEV (t=-2.669; p=0.009), SIZE (t=13.726; p=0.000), 
BDSIZE (t=8.357; p=0.000), BDIND (t=1.787; p=0.078), BDNON-NAT (t=2.666; 
p=0.009) and COUNT (t=-2.488; p=.015).  
No evidence was found to support hypothesis H1, being that the relation between the 
proportion of women (BDWOM) in boards and company performance (TUR) is not 
statistically significant (t=0.408; p=0.684). These results do not agree with the evidence 
achieved by Erhardt et al., (2003); Francoeur, Labelle and Sinclair-Desgagné, (2008) and 
Adams and Ferreira, (2009), who pose that higher participation of women in boards 
boosts firm performance. However, these results are consistent with those of Carter et al., 
(2003) and Adams, Gupta and Leeth, (2009) that report inconclusive results. 
It is observed that BDSIZE positively impacts company performance, hence supporting 
hypothesis H2, which implies that large board of directors lead to higher levels of 
company performance. On the same line with these results, Zahra and Pearce, (1989) and 
Guest, (2009) confirm that that larger boards have greater collective information in their 
possession, leading to a higher performance. On the other hand, these findings do not 
corroborate with the study of Jensen (1993), which states that smaller company boards 
enhance firm performance. 
Hypothesis H3 which tests if company perfomance is affected by the type of audit firm 
hired is also not supported by the model (t=0.712; p=0.479). Contrarily to the results 
achieved by Lee and Lee (2013), which proved that the equity book value and the earnings 
audited by Big 4 auditors justify more the variations in stock returns than those audited 
by other auditors, the results on this paper are inconclusive.  
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(Constant) 4.961 2.310  2.148 .035** .358 9.564   
LEV -1.019 .382 -.107 -2.669 .009*** -1.781 -.258 .936 1.069 
SIZE .858 .062 .906 13.726 .000*** .733 .982 .345 2.903 
BDSIZE .325 .039 .656 8.357 .000*** .247 .402 .871 1.149 
BDWOM .580 1.421 .033 .408 .684 -2.252 3.412 .800 1.251 
BDIND 1.431 .801 .150 1.787 .078* -.165 3.027 .760 1.316 
BDNON_NA
T 
1.763 .661 .211 2.666 .009*** .445 3.081 .855 1.169 
BDAGE .061 .038 .130 1.592 .116 -.015 .137 .808 1.237 
BDEXT .484 1.014 .043 .477 .635 -1.537 2.504 .657 1.522 
BDEXEC 2.051 1.230 .188 1.668 .100 -.400 4.503 .422 2.368 
AUD .346 .487 .060 .712 .479 -.623 1.316 .761 1.315 
COUNT -1.204 .441 -.327 -2.733 .008*** -2.082 -.326 .374 2.670 
a. Dependent Variable: TUR 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; *. Correlation is significant 
at the 0.1 level. 
 
Focusing on the participation of foreigners in boards of directors, it has been found that 
larger participation of non-nationals leads to better company performance. This confirms 
hypothesis H4 and in the same time corroborates with the study based in the Korean 
market by Choi, Park and Yoo (2007), which confirms that diverse nationalities within 
the board positively affect firm performance. However, these findings are not aligned 
with the study based on Switzerland, which shows that a large number of diverse 
nationalities in boards can create conflicts and affect the decision making process, hence 
negatively affecting firm perfomance (Ruigrok, Peck and Tacheva 2007). 
Regarding outside directors, it has been tested if the experitise they bring to the board 
positively affects its perfomance. Hypothesis H5 is not confirmed being that the 
relationship between outside directors (BDEXT) and TUR is not statistically significant 
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(t=0.477; p=.635). These results do not confirm the literature of Dahya and Mcconnell 
(2005) and Brickley and James (1987) which points out that a relevant number of external 
directors has the tendency increase company’s overall performance. Neverthless, many 
other studies also report inconclusive results on the link between company performance 
and the ratio of external directors (Mehran, 1995; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Bhagat 
and Black, 2008). 
  
5.3 Comparison between Portugal and Spain 
A final analysis is conducted in order to evidence the differences between the two 
countries, Portugal and Spain. The purpose is to identify whether the distribution of 
variances and means of the dependent and independent variables are the same for 
Portuguese and Spanish firms. As shown in Table 6 below, two test have been performed, 
the Levene’s Test for equality of variances and the T-Test for equality of means. In this 
analysis the null hypothesis states that the variance and the mean of the variables are 
equally distributed across both countries.  
The null hypothesis is rejected only for TUR, SIZE, BDIND, BDAGE, BDEXT, 
BDEXEC and AUD, meaning that these board characteristics differ across the two 
countries. The explanation behind these differences could be from different corporate 






Table 6: Comparison between Portugal and Spain 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 




























































69.022 .000 -3.364 81 .001*** -.222 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; *. Correlation is significant at 
the 0.1 level. 
 
Nevertheless the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for LEV, BDSIZE, BDWOM, and 
BDNON-NAT, meaning that these board characteristics are similar between the two 
countries. This could be explained by cultural similarities between the countries, but more 
importantly the firms comply by the same rules in the financial markets, which is 
regulated by European laws. 
22 
 
6. Conclusions and final remarks 
The efficacy of corporate governance frameworks has received substantial attention by 
researchers, academics and governmental institutions during the last decades. Companies 
have to comply with corporate governance frameworks which introduce a set of internal 
and external mechanisms that can affect companies’ overall performance positively or 
negatively, depending how they are implemented.  
This work project analysis the relationship between board characteristics and company 
performance measured by turnover for non-financial companies listed in the Portuguese 
and Spanish stock exchange. Turnover is the only measure of performance used in this 
research, being that other measures such as ROE, ROA, ROS and Net Income showed no 
significance level in the F-Tests when regressed with the independent variables. The 
results show that among all the independent variables considered for the model, only the 
size of the board and the proportion of non-nationals and independent directors sitting on 
the board of directors affect company performance. Hence, it can be stated that only 
hypothesis H2 and H4 are confirmed by the statistical model conducted for this study. A 
second analysis is performed in order to point out the differences in the distribution of 
some variables when comparing the two Iberian countries. The null hypothesis is rejected 
for the company size and leverage, proportion of executives and outside directors, board 
members average age and the type of audit firm hired. Hence, these board attributes differ 
between Portuguese and Spanish companies. 
This work project has some limitations that should be considered in future developments 
of the topic. Firstly, this research was focused only on listed non-financial companies. 
Secondly, data used for this analysis is for only one year and two countries. As last, only 
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one proxy was used to measure company performance. Therefore, it is suggested that 
future studies extend the timeline, the range of companies and countries by using other 
performance measures and apply other statistical models in order to thoroughly 
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